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SHOULD COURTS HANG ON EVERY
WORD OF CONGRESS'S HANGING






As part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Consumer Protection
Act of 2005, Congress added a paragraph to the bankruptcy code governing
the confirmation of Chapter 13 plans.' This addition has led to the recent
confusion about how courts should approach claims secured by vehicles
that are surrendered as part of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan.2 This
confusion has led to a nation wide circuit split as well as majority and
minority approaches to the controversy.3  This modem dilemma
undoubtedly challenges the law's pursuit of predictability, stability, and
logic.
Too often lawyers complicate intuitive and simple concepts with
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1. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §
306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005).
2. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osborn, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *819 (8th Cir. Feb. 5,
2008).
3. Id.
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complex jargon. The concept discussed in this Note is straightforward as
illustrated by the following example. Tommy, age six, gives his ball to
Nathan, a fellow-first grader, in exchange for five dollars. Nathan uses the
ball during recess and gets it dirty, but does not pay Tommy the five
dollars. Tommy takes back his ball, and already having a sophisticated
business sense, resells it to Katie for three dollars, the depreciated value of
the now dirty ball. Does Tommy have a right to ask Nathan for the two-
dollar difference? Intuitively, the answer is yes.
While this example is an oversimplification, the concept of debt and
collateral is not complex. This same question in more complicated
bankruptcy jargon is whether undersecured creditors have a right to a
deficiency claim against debtors who surrender their vehicle as part of their
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan.4 This question may be daunting at first.
However, inserting the characters from the above example into a real case
discussing the issue, Capital One Auto Finance v. Osborn, provides the
following illustration: Tommy is the creditor, or Capital One Auto Finance
and Nathan is the debtor, or Nathan L. Osborn.5 Nathan L. Osbom
purchased a vehicle, failed to make payments, and then attempted to
surrender it as part of his Chapter 13 plan in full repayment of his debt on
the vehicle.6
Prior to 2005, courts followed the intuitive result that creditors had a
claim for the difference between the balance of the debt owed on the
vehicle ($5 in the ball example or $20,279.80 in Capital One) and the
resale value of the surrendered vehicle ($3 in the ball example and $10,800
in Capital One).7 In 2005, Congress added complicated jargon in the form
of a "hanging paragraph" 8 to 11 U.S.C. 1325(a), the statute guiding Chapter
13 plans, in order to solve one problem, but ended up causing another.9
This paragraph was added by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA) in an effort to eliminate
"cram down" as part of Chapter 13 plans.10 Cram down allowed debtors
prior to 2005 to retain their vehicle and only repay its present value at the
time of filing their petition for bankruptcy over the life of their plans."
Thus, if applied to Capital One, Osborne would only be expected to pay
$10,800 (the present value of the vehicle at the time he filed for Chapter 13
4. Id. at *819.
5. Id. at *817.
6. Id.
7. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 336 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
8. This is a term of art created by courts to identify a freestanding unnumbered paragraph
positioned after 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(9) (2006).
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
10. Capital One, 2008 WL 304750, at *820; see also In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 330.
11. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (referring to the present or resale
value of the vehicle as the cram down value).
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bankruptcy) over the life of his Chapter 13 plan to retain the vehicle.
2
This is similar to Nathan deciding after he has played with the ball and
gotten it dirty that he would like to keep it but only pay $3, the reduced
value of the ball.
Cram down was possible due to bifurcation of claims, or separation of
the secured and unsecured value of the claim.13 The secured value of a
claim is backed by the value of the collateral securing that claim, whereas
any amount of debt not secured by collateral is considered an unsecured
claim.14 The hanging paragraph eliminates cram down by eliminating the
debtor's ability to separate his or her claim into secured and unsecured
claims.1 5 For example, when Osborn originally financed his vehicle, the
lien was secured for $20,279.80, the value of the new car. But as the car
depreciated, the value of the secured claim depreciated as well. 16  If a
month after purchasing the vehicle, it was worth $20,000, then Capital One
would have a secured claim for $20,000 and an unsecured claim for the
remaining $279.80, or the value of debt not backed by collateral.17
The 2005 provision apparently eliminates this division of claims.1 8 If
the claim cannot divide into secured and unsecured, courts have found the
entire value of the debt remains fully secured. This includes cases where
the value of the collateral depreciates. 9 Thus, if a debtor wishes to retain
his or her vehicle, he or she must pay the entire value of the debt, not just
the present value of the collateral at the time of petition.20
Courts have had difficulty applying the 2005 provision when debtors
choose to surrender their vehicle as part of their Chapter 13 plan. Prior to
2005, Courts unanimously ruled that the debtor could surrender the vehicle
in full satisfaction of his or her secured claim and creditors still had a claim
against the debtor for the unsecured portion.21 Thus, if Nathan drove the
vehicle for a month and then decided to surrender the vehicle as part of his
Chapter 13 plan he would owe Capital One $279.80, the value of
depreciation for that month, and Capital One would ideally recover the
remaining $20,000 debt by reselling the car for the present value.22 The
2005 hanging paragraph however has caused courts to second-guess this
12. Capital One, 2008 WL 304750 at *817.
13. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) (defining bifurcation).
14. Id.
15. Capital One, 2008 WL 304750 at *820.
16. Id. at *819.
17. § 506.
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006) (stating that § 506 no longer applies to claims secured by vehicles
purchased within 910 days of the petition date for personal use).
19. § 506 (providing that the amount of a secured claim is limited by the value of the collateral).
20. Capital One, 2008 WL 304750 at *819 (the entire value of the debt being the secured claim
that the debtor must account for as part of her/his Chapter 13 plan).
21. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535, 540 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
22. Id.
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procedure.23
Today, courts diverge on how to treat these surrendered vehicle
claims. Some courts find that creditors are still responsible for paying the
deficiency amount between what they promised to pay on the vehicle and
what the creditor can recover on that debt by reselling the vehicle.24 Other
courts have found that since Congress determined that claims could no
longer be split into secured and unsecured, the vehicle must be surrendered
in full satisfaction of the entire claim. Thus, the debtor owes nothing after
surrendering the vehicle. However, the minority approach that debtor's
are responsible for paying the deficiency value is more logical. This
approach is supported by legislative intent and statutory interpretation.
Part I of this Note will review Chapter 13 bankruptcy plans. Part II
will examine the statutes that are involved in this controversy, mainly §
1325 of the Bankruptcy Code, which governs confirmations of Chapter 13
plans and § 506 of the Code which governs bifurcations. Part III will
review the majority and minority approaches of courts between 2005 to
present. Part IV will introduce a legally sound solution to the controversy
and propose an amendment to § 1325. By adopting the minority approach
courts will approach this issue in a predictable and logical manner.
Further, by amending the placement of the hanging paragraph to be
exclusively applicable to § 1325(a)(5)(B), or retained vehicles, Congress
can avoid any confusion about the purpose of the hanging paragraph.
II. HISTORY AND LAW OF SURRENDERED VEHICLES
A. CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY PLANS
Chapter 13 bankruptcy, also known as Wage Earner Bankruptcy,
includes a repayment plan between the debtor and trustee later confirmed
by the court. Debtors typically complete the plan's payments within three
to five years.26 To qualify for this type of bankruptcy, one must (1) be an
individual (2) with a steady income and (3) have debts under a proscribed
amount.27 This option is ideal for debtors who would like to keep their




26. THE EDITORS OF SOCRATES, BANKRUPTCY, AN ACTION PLAN FOR RENEWAL 93 (Katharine
Norman et al. ed., Socrates 2006); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1322 (2006) (governs the claims that may be
part of the Chapter 13 plan while section 1325 governs the requirements for confirmation of the plan).
27. THE EDITORS OF SOCRATES, supra note 26, at 94. As of April 1, 2007 a Chapter 13 debtor
may not have more than $336,900 in unsecured debt or more than $1,010,650 in secured debt, figures
Vol. 5.:2
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property rather than lose it through liquidation, as in Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
28
The debtor can propose modifications of a secured claim as part of his
or her Chapter 13 plan.29 If the modification of a secured claim is
acceptable to the creditor, then the court confirms the plan.30 The debtor
may also choose to surrender the property securing the claim so that the
creditor will no longer have a secured claim.31 Each of these modifications
is illustrated under 11 U.S.C. § 1325 of the Bankruptcy Code as Chapter 13
plans that must be confirmed by the court.
B. THE HANGING PARAGRAPH IN 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
In 2005, the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act ("BAPCPA") added a hanging paragraph to the end of 11 U.S.C. §
1325(a)(9). 32  The name "hanging paragraph" was coined in response to
Congress inserting a freestanding, unnumbered paragraph between 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) and 1325(b)(1).33 The purpose of adding the hanging34
paragraph was to add protection for secured creditors. Congress made
this addition in response to cram down, a situation in which a debtor could
retain the vehicle securing a debt yet pay only the present value of the
collateral to the creditor over the life of the Chapter 13 plan.35 The
remaining balance of the debt would become an unsecured claim. 36 The
BAPCPA sought to achieve this goal by adding a provision under § 1325
that eliminates the use of § 506, the bifurcation section, in cases where the
debtor has purchased a vehicle for personal use within 910 days of filing
for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
37
Courts use § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code to determine the value of
the debtor's secured claim. 38 This statute allows courts to cram down the
that are adjusted over time.
28. STEPHEN ELIAS & ROBIN LEONARD, CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, REPAY YOUR DEBTS 10 (Lisa
Guerin ed., Nolo 2006).
29. DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN A NUTSHELL 381, (Thomson West
2005).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(A) (2006).




34. H.R. REP. No. 109-31(1), 140, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 103.
35. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osbom, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *820 (8th Cir. Feb. 5,
2008).
36. Id.
37. § 1325(a) (see specifically the hanging paragraph).
38. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
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secured claim to the value of the collateral. 39 The remaining balance of a
debt becomes an unsecured claim by the creditor against the debtor.40
Eliminating the use of § 506 is the equivalent of prohibiting bifurcation on41
claims that fall under the terms of that statute. Since the secured claim is
not split into secured and unsecured, the entire debt remains a secured
claim regardless of the diminishing value of the collateral.42
Prior to BAPCPA's additional provision, debtors had three options for
creating a Chapter 13 plan with respect to vehicles purchased within 910
days of bankruptcy and having the plan confirmed. The options were: (1)
obtain the creditor's acceptance of their plan under § 1325(a)(5)(A); (2)
retain the vehicle and use § 506 to bifurcate the claim into secured and
unsecured portions, and pay the creditor the cram down amount under §
1325(a)(5)(B); or (3) surrender the vehicle in full satisfaction of the secured
claim, with the difference in value between the collateral and the loan
remaining as an unsecured claim.43
The hanging V aragraph, also termed by some courts as the "anti-cram
down provision,' changes the options available to debtors by preventing
the use of § 506 in order to cram down their payment plan to present value
of the retained vehicle. 45 By placing the unnumbered hanging paragraph at
the end of § 1325(a)(9), Congress gave the impression that it intended for
the provision to affect both retained and surrendered vehicles.46
The effect of the hanging paragraph on retained vehicles is that it
eliminates the debtor's ability to use § 506 to bifurcate his/her claim on
vehicles purchased for personal use and within 910 days of the petition
date.47 These debtors are thus left with three similar, yet different options
from the pre-BAPCPA days. The options are to (1) obtain the creditor's
acceptance of the plan; (2) retain the collateral and make full payment of
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 338 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
41. § 1325(a) (identifying vehicles purchased within 910 days of the petition date for personal use
as no longer being subject to bifurcation of claims under § 506); see also § 506.
42. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 335 (referring to the creditor's argument that since § 506 does not
apply to § 1325 per the addition of the hanging paragraph, the secured claim on the vehicle in question
remains secured and must be considered such as part of the debtor's plan); see also Capital One Auto
Finance v. Osbom, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *822 (8th Cir. Feb. 5, 2008).
43. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
44. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. at 333-34.
45. "Retained vehicles" will be used frequently throughout to refer to vehicles that are retained per
§ 1325(a)(5)(B) in the debtor's plan. See In re Particka, 355 B.R. at 622.
46. § 1325(a)(9) (the placement of the hanging paragraph is after § 1325(a)(9) and refers to all
sections above which includes all sections under 1325(a), 1325(a)(5)(A), 1325(a)(5)(B), and
1325(a)(5)(C). Section 1325(a)(5)(A) is beyond the scope of this Note because if both the creditor and
debtor agree to a Chapter 13 plan, there is no question as to bifurcation of the claims). "Surrendered
vehicle" will be used throughout the Note to refer to vehicles that are surrendered per § 1325(a)(5)(C)
of the debtors plan.
47. Capital One, 2008 WL 304750, at *821-22.
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the creditor's allowed secured claim; or (3) surrender the collateral to the
creditor.48
The difference between the pre-BAPCPA option and the post-
BAPCPA options is that the debtors cannot bifurcate their claim using §
506.49 Thus, to retain the vehicle, the debtor's Chapter 13 plan has to
include not only the present value of the vehicle on the petition date but
also the difference between that amount and the total debt, which equates to
the entire debt.5 °
C. THE JUDICIAL CONTROVERSY OVER INTERPRETING THE HANGING
PARAGRAPH
Controversy arises when courts apply the BAPCPA provision to §
1325(a)(5)(C), or "surrendered vehicles." 1 A majority of courts has found
that since § 506 does not allow for bifurcation, the whole claim remains
secured.52 Thus, surrendering the collateral that secures that claim satisfies
the claim fully. 3  The minority has found that regardless of the
inapplicability of § 506, the creditors have an unsecured claim rooted in
non-bankruptcy law.54  Given this logic, the minority courts find that
creditors have an unsecured claim for the difference between the value of
the vehicle surrendered and the balance of the debt.5 This is the same logic
followed by courts pre-BAPCPA.
1. Secured Versus Unsecured Claims
The terms "secured" and "unsecured claims" have deep roots that are
comparatively biblical in bankruptcy. A secured claim occurs when the
debtor borrows money against specific collateral, and in turn, the creditor
holds a lien on that property. 6 If the debtor defaults on that debt, the
creditor has a right to foreclose on the property and sell it to reimburse
itself for the loan. 7 Thus, the creditor has a secured claim up to the value
48. Id. at *818; see infra Part I.C.
49. In re Particka, 355 BR. at 622.
50. Id.
51. This is a term for claims on surrendered vehicles as part of Chapter 13 plans. See § 1325
(a)(5)(C).
52. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 465 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007)
53. Id.
54. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osborn, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *822-23 (8th Cir. Feb.
5, 2008). (non-bankruptcy law refers to the contract law of the state in which the petition is filed).
55. Id.
56. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535, 621 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
57. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 502 (2004).
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of the property.
58
An unsecured claim is very common in daily commercial uses, such
as credit cards, where the creditor holds no interest in the debtor's property
as security for payment. 59 In cases where the claim is secured and the
value of the collateral diminishes, it no longer secures the creditor for the
full amount of the debt owed. 60 That creditor becomes undersecured 61 and
its claim becomes both a secured claim for the present value of the
collateral and an unsecured claim for the remaining balance of the debt.62
Such secured claims are recognized in bankruptcy law under Bankruptcy
Code § 101(51).63
When a debtor promises payment in exchange for the financing
company holding a lien upon the vehicle, the debtor and creditor form a
legal relationship. 64 The first part of that relationship is that the finance
company obtains a right to payment enforceable under state contract law.
65
Second, due to the finance company's lien on the vehicle, it acquires a
security interest in the vehicle, as defined by § 101(51).66
2. Bankruptcy Law and Non-Bankruptcy Law
While § 506 allows for bifurcation of claims, it is § 502 of the
Bankruptcy Code that allows claims to be filed in the bankruptcy case in
the first place.67 Unless a party of interest objects, § 502 allows a creditor
to bring claims into the bankruptcy proceeding.68 Once a claim is
permitted, § 506, where it applies, determines the extent to which the claim
58. Id. (giving an example of a situation in which a debtor defaults and the creditor repossesses and
resells the vehicle). See also supra note 19, and accompanying text.
59. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006) and accompanying text.
60. id. (creating a secured claim for the value of the collateral and an unsecured claim for any
remainder).
61. A creditor is undersecured where the value of the collateral securing the claim falls below the
value of the debt leaving an unsecured claim.
62. § 506.
63. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (2006) defines a claim as a:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured disputed undisputed, legal,
equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such
right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured,
unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured.
Id.
64. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 464-65 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007).
65. Id. at 464.
66. Id. at 464-65; see also In re Particka, 355 B.R 616, 620 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006); 11 U.S.C. §
101(51) ("The term "security interest" means lien created by an agreement.").
67. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2006).
68. Id.
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will be treated as secured or unsecured.69 If § 506 does not apply, the only
consequence is that the claim will not have to meet the valuation
requirement proposed by that section.7° In other words, there are cases
where there are secured claims that are not applicable under § 506. Such
claims include liens that are not within the interest of the estate. 71 The
validity and enforceability of such a claim would be determined by non-
bankruptcy law unless otherwise specified in § 502(b).72
When faced with situations such as a debtor defaulting on his/her car
payments outside of bankruptcy law, the process is simple. The creditor
may foreclose upon its security interest (the car), apply the foreclosure
value to its debt, and the debtor remains liable for any deficiency.74 The
deficiency balance becomes the creditor's unsecured claim against the
debtor.75 Under bankruptcy law, however, where the property securing the
debt is part of the estate, § 506 is used to determine what part of the claim
is secured or unsecured.76
3. The Majority View
By adding the hanging paragraph and precluding the application of §
506 to secured claims on retained vehicles, Congress created a legal fiction
where the collateral securing the claim is worth the exact amount of the
total debt on the date of the petition.77 Considering the rate at which cars
depreciate, the value of a vehicle in such a dispute is usually worth
substantially less than the original value by the date of the petition. 78
Congress' addition eliminates cram down and forces debtors to incorporate
the full value of their debt into their Chapter 13 plans.79
A majority of courts have determined that Congress created a fiction
as applied to surrendered vehicles as well, by allowing the surrendered
vehicle to satisfy fully the creditor's claim regardless of the collateral's
69. In re Particka, 355 B.R. at 620.
70. Id. at 621.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
72. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osborn, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *821-22 (8th Cir. Feb.
5, 2008); In re Particka, 355 B.R. at 620.




77. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 464 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007).
78. Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 963 (1997) (noting that vehicles depreciate
rapidly), superseded by statute I 1 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2006); see also Capital One, 2008 WL 304750
at *819.
79. In re Quick, 371 BR. at 464.
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depreciation. 0  These courts argue that the hanging paragraph
unambiguously leads to this result through a plain language interpretation.81
The language of the hanging paragraph is as follows:
For purposes of paragraph (5) [of § 1325], § 506 shall not apply to a
claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money
security interest securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the
debt was incurred within 910-day preceding the date of the filing of the
petition, and the collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as
defined in § 30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the
debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value,
if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing.
8 2
Paragraph (5) of § 1325(a) dictates whether a court should confirm
the Chapter 13 plan with respect to certain secured claims.8 3 It describes
the different routes that a Chapter 13 debtor may take with his or her
vehicle once he or she has filed the petition.8 4 Once the hanging paragraph
was added at the end of this paragraph, it affected § 1325(a)(5)(B) by
making the entire claim by the creditor against the retained vehicle
secured. This is undisputed.86
If the court decides that § 506 allowed for such bifurcation of the
creditors claim pre-BAPCPA, then it logically follows that eliminating the
use of § 506 from surrendered vehicles should eliminate the ability to
bifurcate the claim.8 7  If however, a court determines that the creditor's
80. Id.
81. Id. at 463-64.
82. § 1325.
83. See id.:
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the plan-(A) the
holder of such claim has accepted the plan; (B)(i) the plan provides that-() the
holder of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the earlier of--(aa) the
payment of the underlying debt determined under non-bankruptcy law; or
(bb)discharge under § 1328; and (H) if the case under this Chapter is dismissed or
converted without completion of the plan, such lien shall also be retained by such
holder to the extent recognized by applicable non-bankruptcy law; of such claim is
not les than the allowed amount of such claim; and (iii) if--() property to be
distributed pursuant to this sub§ is in the form of periodic payments, such payments
shall be in equal monthly amounts; and (I) the holder of the claim is secured by
personal property, the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount
sufficient to provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the
period of the plan; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
such holder.
84. Id.
85. In re Kenney, No. 06-71975-A, 2007 U.S. Bankr. WL 1412921, at *7 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May
10, 2007).
86. See In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 462 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the concept that a
debtor can no longer cram down a 910 debt, but must account for the entire amount of the debt as a
secured claim into his or her Chapter 13 plan is universally accepted).
87. In re Quick, 371 B.R. at 463.
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deficiency claim was always governed by non-bankruptcy state law, then
BAPCPA's prohibition of the use of § 506 on surrendered vehicles should
be a moot point, as it was never applicable to the claim.8 These divergent
approaches to the logical implication of the hanging paragraph form the
basis of the distinction between the majority and minority views on this
issue. The majority of courts find that § 506 was the source of creditors'
deficiency claims prior to BAPCPA's hanging paragraph,89 whereas a
minority of courts find that creditors' rights to deficiency claims after the
vehicle is surrendered are rooted in state law.
90
4. The Minority View
The minority base their logic on the language of § 506 to determine
that the section does not apply to surrendered vehicles. 91 The minority
contends that § 506 by its own language excludes plans in which the debtor
chooses to surrender the vehicle from being bifurcated by its terms.92 The
minority points to the fact that once a vehicle is surrendered, the estate no
longer has an interest in that vehicle.93 This supports the theory that the
drafters of § 506 did not intend surrendered vehicles to be subject to
bifurcation under this section. 94 Rather, the minority argues that the claim
is allowed into bankruptcy under § 502 and completely determined by state
law which is the governing law unless the Bankruptcy Code interferes.95 In
this case, if the above argument is the chosen one, it appears that § 506 of
88. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535, 547 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (noting that II U.S.C. § 506 never
applied to cases with surrendered collateral, and thus the law remains as it was before BAPCPA's
amendment).
89. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 339 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (explaining that pre-BAPCPA, § 506
was applied at the very least indirectly to bifurcate the creditor's claim into secured and unsecured).
90. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 547.
91. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 624 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the estate has
an interest, or that is subject to setoff under section 553 of this title, is a secured
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in
such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the case may be,
and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest or
the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such allowed claim. Such
value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction with any hearing
on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.
11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
92. Id. (citing § 506 to illustrate that the provision was only meant to apply to claims secured by
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the bankruptcy code does not interfere.96
Since BAPCPA added this paragraph to the end of § 1325(a) in 2005,
courts have been split as to whether to grant a debtor's deficiency claim.
97
This unresolved issue is causing inconsistent rulings, appeals, and
instability in this area of the law today.
III. A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE JUDICIAL
CONTROVERSY
The minority approach, which has been adopted by the seventh,
eighth, and ninth circuits is superior. 98 This approach allows the creditor its
deficiency claim after a debtor surrenders a vehicle as part of its Chapter 13
plan.99 Further, if Congress amends its placement of the hanging paragraph
to clarify that it eliminates the use of § 506 only in instances where the
vehicle is retained, it would eliminate the confusion that has plagued courts
for the last four years.'00
A. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
The first step that courts must grapple with is whether they find the
statutes involved to be ambiguous. If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous then the sole function of the court is to enforce it according to
its terms..01 Only one court faced with the issue has determined that the
hanging paragraph was ambiguous.10 2  This was most likely due to the
conflict between the intentions of Congress in adding the hanging
paragraph and the outcome that the majority courts find it has on
surrendered vehicles; the Congressional intent being to protect creditors,
and the outcome being creditors losing their deficiency claim. 103
The section of the BAPCPA that added the hanging paragraph is titled
"Section 306-Giving Secured Creditors Fair Treatment in Chapter 13,
96. Id.
97. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 462 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007).
98. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osbom, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *819 (8th Cir. Feb. 5,
2008).
99. Id.
100. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) ("[1]t would have made even more
sense to have included the hanging paragraph in § 1325(a)(5)(B) instead of appending it to § 1325
(a)(9).").
101. In re Kenney, No. 06-71975-A, 2007 U.S. Bankr. WL 1412921, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May
10, 2007) (citing In re Osborn, 363 B.R. 72, 78 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2007)).
102. In re Duke, 345 B.R. 806, 809 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2006).
103. See generally In re Kenney, 2007 WL 1412921.
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Restoring the Foundation for Secured Credit. ' '1°4 While there is minimal
legislative history, and what there is repeats the statutory language, the title
conveys that Congress intended to provide added protection to creditors.10 5
Thus, it is illogical that Congress's addition would protect creditors'
against cram down with retained vehicles all the while preventing their
deficiency claim with surrendered vehicles.10 6 This finding by a majority
of courts is a finding that Congress either lacks consistency or is unaware
of the effects of its legislation.1r 7 This inconsistent conclusion is not what
Congress intended, and courts finding such have fallen short of accurate
legislative interpretation.0 8
Regardless of the lack of legislative history, legislative intent and
history are only necessary where the relevant statue is ambiguous. 109 Based
on the language in the hanging paragraph, all courts ruling on the issue
except for one have found that the language is unambiguous. 110 The
language of the hanging paragraph clearly states that § 506 does not
apply.' The confusion lies in the predicament the majority courts are
faced with when they determine that § 506 no longer applies per the
hanging paragraph, but recognize that the purpose of hanging paragraph is
to help creditors.'1 12 This inconsistent view supports the minority approach
because it explains away inconsistencies of the hanging paragraph as
applied to confirmation of both surrendered and retained vehicle plans.'
1 13
B. SAFETY IN NUMBERS?
For the majority position to be correct, it must be true that § 506 was
104. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, §
306(b), 119 Stat. 23, 80 (2005).
105. In reDuke, 345 B.R. at 809; In re Kenney, 2007 WL 1412921 at *7.
106. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535, 543 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
107. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (citing the creditor's argument that
the majority's logic of extinguishing the creditor's deficiency claim is inconsistent with the purpose of
the hanging paragraph); In re Payne, 347 BR. 278, 283 (Bankr. S.D. Oh. 2006).
108. See generally H.R. REP. No. 109-31(, 140, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 103.
109. Id.
110. In re Kenney, No. 06-71975-A, 2007 U.S. Bankr. WL 1412921, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Va. May
10,2007).
111. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
112. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 463 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007) ("[lit may well be that elimination of
deficiency claims was intended to offset, on behalf of 910 debtors, the benefit conferred upon secured
910 creditors by eliminating the cram down option. However, our determination of unambiguity
eliminates the necessity of elucidating such an intent.").
113. In re Rodriguez, 375 BR. 535, 547 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007) (noting that the court in In re
Particka recognized the majority of courts proceeded from an incorrect assumption that deficiency
claims are only created under bankruptcy law).
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used to bifurcate the claims prior to 2005.114 This is not the case."H5 The
majority has incorrectly concluded that § 506 establishes the right to assert
a deficiency claim." 6 In fact, it is state law that determines whether the
creditor has a right to an unsecured deficiency claim."7
It is not § 506 that determines whether a bankruptcy claim is allowed:
that is the function of § 502.1 8 Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code
governs the allowance of claims or interests into the bankruptcy case.1 9 To
reject a claim, a court must find that it is prohibited under § 502.20 Claims
under state law are allowed into the bankruptcy case by way of § 502.12 1 In
these cases, the creditors have an unsecured claim based in state contract
law and allowed into the bankruptcy case under § 502, not § 506.122 Once
the claim is part of the bankruptcy case, only then can § 506 apply,
assuming the claim is part of the estate.
When a debtor surrenders his or her vehicle as part of his or her
Chapter 13 plan, three events occur simultaneously. 123 The first is that the
plan must be confirmed under 1325(a)(5)(C); secondly, the vehicle is
surrendered in full repayment of the secured value of the debt, and third,
the vehicle is no longer part of the estate, and thus the bankruptcy sections
that apply to properties of the estate no longer apply. 24 Section 506, which
by its terms only applies to property of the estate, cannot be used to
bifurcate claims on vehicles that have been surrendered. 25  Thus, pre- and
post-BAPCPA creditors have used state contract law in order to collect
their remaining deficiency claim on surrendered vehicles.
26
The only case in which bankruptcy does not recognize a state law
claim is where a provision of the Bankruptcy Code disallows the claim.
127
114. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 339 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (citing the argument that if § 506 was
not used to bifurcate claim on surrendered vehicles pre-BAPCPA then the addition of the hanging
paragraph makes no difference to the ability to bifurcate).
115. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 624 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) ("The bifurcation process of§ 506
does not, and never did, apply to determine a secured and unsecured portion of a secured creditor's
allowed claim where the estate does not have an interest in the property securing such claim.").
116. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 542 ("The majority position holds that section 506 (and only
section 506) creates defines and governs deficiency claim.").
117. Id. at 543.
118. 11 US.C. § 502 (2006) ("A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of this
title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest, including a creditor of a general partner in a
partnership that is a debtor in a case under Chapter 7 of this title, objects.").
119. Id.
120. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 545 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. ofAmerica v. Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co., 127 S. Ct. 1199, 1206 (2007)).
121. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 546
122. Id. (indicating that creditors' security interests rest on the Uniform Commercial Code).
123. Id. at 543-44.
124. Id. at 544.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 545.
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The hanging paragraph does not disallow the remaining deficiency claim
for two reasons. The first is that it does not prohibit bifurcation, but
specifically disallows the use of § 506.128 Secondly, § 506 never applied to
surrendered vehicles as that section is only applied to collateral that is part
of the estate. 129 Thus, § 506, which requires that the collateral be part of
the estate in order to use that section to bifurcate the claim, is not
applicable to surrendered vehicles.' 30 Prior to 2005, deficiency claims were
consistently allowed under state law, not § 506.13' Thus, the hanging
paragraph should not change the court's approach to such plans, especially




The question that Congress leaves courts guessing is why it did not
place the hanging paragraph at the end of the retained vehicle section of the
Code. '33  The purpose of the addition was to eliminate cram down, a
situation that prior to 2005 only occurred as part of retained vehicle
plans. 134 The placement of the hanging paragraph in a way that is inclusive
of surrendered vehicle claims is what has undoubtedly led a majority of
courts to comfortably, yet wrongly, determine that § 506 actually had
affected surrendered vehicles in the past.135 Their reasoning being that
Congress would not clarify that § 506 no longer applies to a section that
never applied § 506 in the first place.
136
Unfortunately, legislative history provides no definitive answer to this
question. However, there are hints as to what Congress had in mind when
it determined the placement of the hanging paragraph. Courts faced with
this question have guessed the reasoning behind Congress's placement. 
37
One of the courts agreeing with the minority view, In re Rodriguez,
determined that Congress applied the hanging paragraph to surrendered
vehicles as well because § 506(b) speaks to valuation, a concept that is
128. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006).
129. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 546; 11 U.S.C. § 506 (2006).
130. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. at 546.
131. Id. at 543-44.
132. Id. at 544.
133. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006) (noting that the only section of
1325(a) that is affected by the addition of the hanging paragraph is the retained vehicle section, §
1325(a)(5)(A)).
134. In re Ezell, 338 B.R. 330, 334 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006).
135. In re Quick, 371 B.R. 459, 463 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2007).
136. Id.
137. In reRodriguez, 375 B.R. at 544.
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applicable to both retained and surrendered vehicles.138 By prohibiting the
application of § 506 to surrendered vehicles Congress forces debtors to
consider the total amount realized upon liquidation rather than the
replacement value when determining the remaining claim to be part of their
plan. 139 In many cases, this will result in the creditor having a larger
deficiency claim. 40 This seems to explain the reason Congress prohibited
§ 506 application to surrendered vehicles and is consistent with its intent to
help creditors. Congress left courts hanging as to the logical placement of
the hanging paragraph.141
D. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
In order to avoid confusion Congress should amend § 1325 by
moving the hanging paragraph so that it is physically located under
1325(a)(5)(B). 142 The section with the suggested changes would read as
follows:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm
a plan if ... (5) with respect to each allowed secured claim
provided for by the plan-(A) the holder of such claim has
accepted the plan; (B) (i) the plan provides that--(I) the holder
of such claim retain the lien securing such claim until the
earlier of--(aa) the payment of the underlying debt determined
under nonbankruptcy law; or (bb) discharge under section
1328; and(II) if the case under this Chapter is dismissed or
converted without completion of the plan, such lien shall also
be retained by such holder to the extent recognized by
applicable nonbankruptcy law; (ii) the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on
account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of
such claim; (iii) if--(I) property to be distributed pursuant to
this subsection is in the form of periodic payments, such
payments shall be in equal monthly amounts; and (II) the
holder of the claim is secured by personal property, the amount
of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to
provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during
the period of the plan; and (iv) For purposes this subsection,





142. In re Particka, 355 B.R. 616, 625 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2006).
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purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day
preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the collateral
for that debt consists of a motor vehicle (as defined in section
30102 of title 49) acquired for the personal use of the debtor, or
if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of value, if
the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that
filing; or (C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such
claim to such holder[.]
This way the hanging paragraph will eliminate cram down by
prohibiting bifurcation of a claim against a retained vehicle to achieve
Congressional intent.1 43 Since § 506 was never used to bifurcate claims
under 1325(a)(5)(A), as those claims were agreed upon by the creditor and
debtor, or 1325(a)(5)(C), as that property is no longer part of the estate, it is
not necessary for Congress to prohibit § 506's application to those
sections. 144 Further, Congress does not need to eliminate the application of
506(b) to surrendered vehicles. 145 As mentioned, state contract law creates
the creditors' deficiency claim, so that any amount not recovered through
resale will become an unsecured claim per the sales agreement.
146
IV. CONCLUSION
With the proposed approach and amendments to § 1325, Courts
would consistently find as was found in Capital One that people like
Nathan L. Osborne are liable for a deficiency claim regardless of his
surrendering the vehicle in full satisfaction of the secured portion. 147 Thus,
as illustrated by the ball hypothetical, once Nathan decides to surrender the
ball (or collateral) to Tommy in fully satisfaction of the secured claim,
Tommy still has a claim for the depreciated value, or unsecured portion.
Once Tommy resells the ball for its present value of three dollars to Katie,
Nathan will owe Tommy the two-dollar difference. Tommy, the creditor




146. In re Rodriguez, 375 B.R. 535, 546 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007).
147. Capital One Auto Finance v. Osborn, No. 07-1726, 2008 WL 304750 at *819 (8th Cir. Feb. 5,
2008).
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